Avoiding Buridan's Ass
As Easy As
1-2-1
----
To avoid Buridan's Ass
Do Not Make A Decision
To avoid An irrevocable Decision
Do Not Call It Forth
If you want to be an Emperor
Imperate
If you want to be a deferrer
Deferate
As Easy As
1-2-1
----
To avoid Buridan's Ass
Do Not Make A Decision
To avoid An irrevocable Decision
Do Not Call It Forth
If you want to be an Emperor
Imperate
If you want to be a deferrer
Deferate
To avoid Buridan's Ass
'Tis beyond all dispute
And avoids all recisions
It's really quite crass
But beyond all refute
You'll make no revisions
It is truly a gas
Yet you CAN still compute:
Just make no decisions!
(That's not the joke:
the joke is:
it ain't no friggin' joke!)
====
A decision is classically modeled as a unitary discrete soliton event.
In the actual real world, it is usually implemented or carried out by a series of actions, taken largely sequential in nature, with many degrees of freedom that have inherent possibilities of parallelism, lack of irrevocability, untaken alternatives' pre-requisite steps, and common root causal actions of all subsequent final causal results.
Buridan's Ass specifies that, in any scenario involving the reduction of a continuous domain to a discrete range, there will be at least one point of uncertainty where the decision to do so cannot be made instantaneously: the Ass will fail to choose immediately, or will have to choose randomly. There are more general statements of it than this.
If you modally model the overall paradigm as completely as possible (including as many degrees of freedom as possible against the actual implementational reality), you will include as many sub-precursors as possible for alternative positioning within the actual manifold space of that trope set.
Additionally, asserted:
F Varela notes the distinction between states internal to the living system (decisions, distinctions) from the states present in the external world (the living system under study). Categories do NOT exist in the real world OUTSIDE the mind: "two" is in concept space, not the real world.
Similarly, in the world of prions, protids, prolids, and subvirals, there MAY be (almost certainly are) larger cooperating sets across semiotic boundaries AS WE RECOGNIZE THEM that "implement" "more complex" "imperatives"
Drawing an ana analogy: same thing here for a "different" "theory" of "decisions": it is highly likely things can be done better/faster/more flexibly than current ultimate bounds of decision theory allow for, BY HAVING A THEORY TO REPLACE DECISION THEORY AT IT'S BASIS or even entirely outside of any form of modeling at all.
====
A decision is classically modeled as a unitary discrete soliton event.
In the actual real world, it is usually implemented or carried out by a series of actions, taken largely sequential in nature, with many degrees of freedom that have inherent possibilities of parallelism, lack of irrevocability, untaken alternatives' pre-requisite steps, and common root causal actions of all subsequent final causal results.
Buridan's Ass specifies that, in any scenario involving the reduction of a continuous domain to a discrete range, there will be at least one point of uncertainty where the decision to do so cannot be made instantaneously: the Ass will fail to choose immediately, or will have to choose randomly. There are more general statements of it than this.
If you modally model the overall paradigm as completely as possible (including as many degrees of freedom as possible against the actual implementational reality), you will include as many sub-precursors as possible for alternative positioning within the actual manifold space of that trope set.
Additionally, asserted:
F Varela notes the distinction between states internal to the living system (decisions, distinctions) from the states present in the external world (the living system under study). Categories do NOT exist in the real world OUTSIDE the mind: "two" is in concept space, not the real world.
Similarly, in the world of prions, protids, prolids, and subvirals, there MAY be (almost certainly are) larger cooperating sets across semiotic boundaries AS WE RECOGNIZE THEM that "implement" "more complex" "imperatives"
Drawing an ana analogy: same thing here for a "different" "theory" of "decisions": it is highly likely things can be done better/faster/more flexibly than current ultimate bounds of decision theory allow for, BY HAVING A THEORY TO REPLACE DECISION THEORY AT IT'S BASIS or even entirely outside of any form of modeling at all.
Example, in re NNP traduction of living semiotic cognitive systems: if you do not distinguish between
cause and effect
goal and result
input and output
you CAN achieve a result without denoting it as such ...
because effectuallyand operationally, no distinction between cause & effect (OR affect) has been made.
If you can avoid making a decision,
you will not have the delays associated with such
in asynchronous computer hardware:
or other forms of 'puters.
But beware:
do not disturb sleeping dragons where they lie at rest.
You may not be able to get them back to sleep again.
The "23 mathematical Challenges" of DARPA (at URL http://www.darpa.mil/dso/personnel/23_math_chall_b_mann.pdf )
are unlike Hilbert's list (at "Wikipedia" URL http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert%27s_problems );
there is an agenda in the later not present in the earlier. Especially Hilbert's 24th problem.
The "23 mathematical Challenges" of DARPA (at URL http://www.darpa.mil/dso/personnel/23_math_chall_b_mann.pdf )
are unlike Hilbert's list (at "Wikipedia" URL http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert%27s_problems );
there is an agenda in the later not present in the earlier. Especially Hilbert's 24th problem.
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